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A railway company is liable for the loss of a passenger's ordinary travelling baggage, but -not for such articles as window'curtains, blankets ,'cutlery, books, ornaments, &c., even when these are packed with the baggageTor which tficy
are liable.
When goods remain at the :station at which a passenger alightS, but it does not
appea" that the railway company has charged, ,oris entitled. to charge, for storage,
the company is not liable as warehousemen.

TgHIS was a motion to. set aside a nonsuit and grant a new trial.

The facts are fully"cited in'the oiinion.'_'
,T H.D.Munson, for plaintiff,
J A. M Aikins, for defendants.''
The opinion of the court ,was delivered by
TAYLOR, J.-In the month of April 1882, pjaintiff'swife purchased from" the agentof 'the Qreat Western Railway :Company, in

M3CAFFREY v. CANADIAN PACIFIC RY. CO.

the city of Toronto, tickets for the conveyance of herself and children, from Toronto to Winnipeg, over certain lines of railway including that of the defendants. At the time of purchasing the
tickets, she had her baggage checked, in the usual way, through
from Toronto to Winnipeg. She reached Winnipeg on the 24th
of April, and on the following day, she and the plaintiff went to
the railway station to get her baggage, and there saw the trunk,
the loss of which is the subject of this action. Her other trunks
had not at this time arrived, and acting, as she says, on the advice
of some person at the station, she did not take it away, but left it
to await the arrival of the others. A. day or two after, the other
trunks arrived, and were taken away by the plaintiff and his wife.
The trunk which had first arrived, had however, in the meantime
disappeared and has never been received by the owner. For the
loss of it, the present action is brought.
The declaration as originally framed had four counts. The first
against the defendants as common carriers of goods for hire, alleging a contract to carry certain goods, and charging a breach of the
contract. The second is in tort, charging that the goods were lost
by the negligence of the defendants while in their possession, as
common carriers. The third is against the defendants as warehousemen and bailees. The fourth is in trover. Before the trial,
a fifth count was added under an order obtained from the Chief
Justice, for the loss of the baggage of the plaintiff's wife, a passenger on the defendant's railway.
The defendants pleaded a number of pleas, those to the fourth
count being, not guilty, and that the goods in question were not
the goods of the plaintiff.
To the added count the defendants pleaded-first, non assumpsit;
second, that the plaintiff did not cause his wife to become and be a
passenger with her luggage as alleged; third, that they are not
carriers of passengers and their luggage as alleged; fourth, that
the luggage was not the property of the plaintiff or his wife as
alleged ; fifth, that they did safely and securely carry the said luggage; sixth; that so far as the added count relates to the following
goods, setting them out in detail, the plaintiff's wife "as such passenger caused to be transferred to the defendants' line of railway,
the articles herein before mentioned as part of her personal luggage,
to be carried as such luggage, and did not give notice to the defendants that her luggage comprised such articles as the articles herein-
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before mentioned, and which was transferred to them as her
personal luggage, that the same were not personal luggage, but
freight or extra luggage, and should have been paid for as such by
the -plaintiff's wife, and the defendants would not have received
them as personal luggage, if they had known what the articles were,
and that the same were while on the said passenger train or at the
railway station lost or stolen ;" and for a seventh plea, that the
luggage was taken to be carried under and by -virtue of a contract
made with another railway company.
At the trial of the action a nonsuit was entered: The plaintiff
afterwards obtained a rule calling on the defendants to show cause
why the nonsuit should not be set aside and a new trial had, and
the two questions now to be decided in disposing of that rule are,
whether the contents of the trunk sued for were, or were not personal luggage, and whether the defendants are, or are not liable as
warehousemen.
The contents of the trunk as given in evidence by the plaintiff's
wife consisted principally of household furnishings, intended for
the use of the family when settled in Winnipeg. Among them
were window curtains, blankets, sheets, counterpanes, feather pillows, pillow-slips, cutlery, books, pictures, parlor ornaments, stereopticon and Views. There were also two silk dresses, petticoats,
childrens' clothing, two suits of gentlemen's clothing, and an opera
glass.
In England, it seems now well settled that the personal luggage
which a passenger is entitled to have carried with him, in right of
his having purchased a ticket for his own conveyance, is limited to
such clothing and such articles as a traveller usually carries with
him, for his personal convenience. Great NAorthern Railway Co.
v. Shepherd, 8 Ex. 38: or, as it is expressed in Story on Bailments, sec. 499, "such articles of necessity or personal convenience, as are usually carried by passengers for their personal use."
See also iudston v. Midland Railway Co., L. R., 4 Q. B. 371.
The question was fully considered in the case of 31acrow v. Great
Western Railway Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 612, where the plaintiff
having left Canada to settle in England, sued the defendants for a
trunk containing sheets, blankets and quilts, lost while he was
travelling with it between Liverpool and London, and the court
held, that the article being intended for the use of the plaintiff's
household when permanently settled, could not be considered as
VoL. XXXIII.-23
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personal or ordinary passenger's luggage, and therefore the company were not liable. Numerous other English cases to the same
effect might be cited, specially Cahill v. London J N W. Railway
Co., 13 0. B. N. S. 818.
The courts in Ontario have followed the English authorities on
this subject. Reference may be made to Shaw v. Grand Trunk
Railway (Jo., 7 U. C. C. P. 493. .Bruty v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 32 U.0. Q. B. 66 and Lee v. Grand Trunk Railway
Co., Id. 350.
In the United States a different rule seems at one time to have
prevailed, on the ground, that the length of the journey and the
requirements of travelling would make articles luggage in that
country, which would not be considered such in England.
Thus in Ouimit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt. 605, a bed, pillows, bedding
and bed-quilts, carried by a man travelling from Canada to the
United States, were held to be personal baggage.
More recently, however, the American decisions are in accordance
with those in England. Thus baggage was held not to include a
trunk, containing valuable merchandise. Pardee v. Drew, 52
Wend. 459; nor samples of merchandise carried to enable the
passenger to make bargains: Hawkins v. Hoffman, 6 Hill 586.'
So silverware carried in the trunk of a passenger has been held
not personal luggage: Bell v. Drew, 4 E. D. Smith 50; and so a
dozen silver teaspoons, a Colt's revolver, or surgical instruments,
except the passenger be connected with the medical profession, are
not: Giles v. _auntleroy, 13 Md. 126. The conclusion to be
drawn from the American decisions is given in a note in 2 Redfield's Am. Ry. Cases 138, in which the question of what particular
articles may, or may not, be carried by a passenger as luggage, is
considered, and it is there said the very word "baggage" or "luggage" as applied to the traveller, implies that it is something which
he "bags up" or "lugs along" with him, for his daily comfort and
convenience on his journey.
Following then what seems now to be the uniform line of decisions in England, the United States, and Ontario, there can be no
doubt that the greater part of the articles contained in the trunk in
question did not come within the class of personal luggage, which a
passenger is entitled to have carried along with him, in virtue of
his having purchased a ticket for his conveyance, and the loss
of which will render the carrier liable. No attempt was made to
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show on the evidence here, as was attempted in Cahill v. London &
N. W. By. Co., 10 0. B. N. S. 154; 13 Id. 818, and in Lee v.
Grand Trunk BRy. Co., 36 U. 0. Q. B. 350, that the company's
servants knew, or from the appearance of the trunk must be
assumed to have known that its contents were not ordinary personal
luggage.
Although the greater part of the contents of this trunk could
not come within the class of personal luggage, some of them did
so. The silk dresses, petticoats, and children's clothing may fairly
be held to do so, and perhaps the opera glass. Tlie two suits of
gentlemen's clothing do not, under the circumstances of this case,
for the trunk was being carried along with the plaintiff's wife.
Women's dresses carried in a man's trunk, have been held clearly
not to be personal luggage, for which the carrier would be responsible: Miss. P. By. v. KYennedy, 41 Miss. 671.
The fact that articles which may fairly be considered personal
luggage are packed and carried with others of a different character,
does not relieve the carrier from liability for the value of the articles,
which are personal luggage. It was so held in Bruty v. Grand
Trunk By. Co., 32 U. 0. Q. B. 66, and in Great N. By. Co. v.
Shepherd, 8 Ex. 80.
As to the count charging the defendants with liability for this
trunk, as warehousemen, we think they are not liable.
The case mainly relied upon by the plaintiff in support of their
liability was Mitchell v. Lancashire& Yorkshire By. Co., L. R.,
10 Q. B. 256. The plaintiff's counsel, on the argument, referred
to that case as one in which BLACKBURN, J., held that if the defendants could charge storage, then they were bailees for him and liable.
He further contended that in the present case, the defendants
charged storage upon the other pieces of luggage brought by the
plaintiff's wife, so that they clearly came within that case. A
reference to the case, however, shows that the language used by the
learned judge was, "I think in this case the railway company, in
holding these goods, could have charged warehouse rent, and that
being so, I think there can be no doubt that prima facie there was
a liability as bailees for reward."
In that case a quantity of flax having been consigned to the
plaintiff at one of the company's stations, a notice was sent him
on its arrival, requiring him to remove it, and stating that the
defendants held it, not as common carriers, but as warehousemen,
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and subject to the usual warehouse charges. The company clearly
put themselves in the position of warehousemen, and gave the
plaintiff notice that they intended charging as 'such for the storage
of the flax. Then there was undoubted evidence of such negligence on their part as would render warehousemen liable. The
contention of the company on certain words in their notice, that the
goods were "at owner's sole risk," amounted, BLACKBURN, J.,
said, to this, "we are, to be paid warehouse rent, and keep them
as warehousemen, but we are not to be bound to take any care of
them at all."
In fact, the sole question in that case was, whether under the
notice as worded the company had any liability at all or not.
In the present case the evidence does not show that defendants
charged or were entitled to charge any storage or warehouse rent,
for this trunk. As to the payment made on the other trunks, the
only evidence is that of the plaintiff himself, and all he said was,
in answer to a question, "Did you have to pay anything on that
baggage ?" "Yes, I paid something like $3.00 for extra baggage
and storage." Now the plaintiff's wife travelled with herself and
six children on two tickets and a half one, and she had with her
five trunks for which quantity a charge for extra luggage might
well be made. We think before the defendants can be made liable
as warehousemen, there should have been clearer evidence that
storage was charged by them on luggage or that they are entitled
to make such a charge. Besides there is no evidence of negligence
on the part of the defendant§. The plaintiff's wife came about the
time of the great floods, which in the spring of 1882, interrupted
railway traffic, the trunk was seen on the platform at the station,
with a number of other trunks, and the plaintiff did not then take
it away but requested one of the defendants' servants to put it
"under the platform out of the drops of wet." Then we learn
from Mr. Pearse, a witness called by the plaintiff, and who is in
the employment of the company, for tracing lost baggage and
freight, that he saw the trunk at Brandon station, and ordered it to
be returned to Winnipeg. His belief is, that the trunk was on its
return to Winnipeg stolen. He says it could not be delivered to
any one, except on a lost check receipt, and there is no such
receipt in existence.
The value of the articles which would properly come within the
designation of personal luggage is sworn by the plaintiff's wife to
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be $96.50, and the plaintiff cannot claim to put them higher than
his own witness, the only one who gives the values, has done. For
this amount the plaintiff should have a verdict. If the parties
agree to a verdict for this amount being entered, the nonsuit granted
at the'trial should be set aside without costs. If they do not, as
this is a jury case, and we cannot enter a verdict unless agreed to,
there must be a new trial without costs.
Passenger preceding or following Baggage.-Ordinarily it makes no difference
whether a passenger goes a few hours
before or a few hours after his baggage.
It is true that it must be carried with
him upon his journey, but substantial
compliance with this requirement suffices.
It need not start or arrive at precisely
the same instant as the passenger's
departure or arrival. The following
instances show this to be the rule of law
and illustrate the liability of the carrier:
A trunk was taken possession of by the
baggage-master, who promised that it
should be safely carried to the point
designated by the passenger, who, however, did not travel with it. Nothing
was said about his paying any compensation for carrying the trunk, which was
lost in transit. Held, company liable:
Wilson v. Grand Trunk Rd., 57 Me.
138. A trunk preceded the passenger
to his final destination on account of his
buying and using a stop-over ticket on
the way. It was rifled of its contents
by burglars in defendant's waiting-room,
where it had been stored. Held, company liable: C., R. I. 4- P. Rd, v.
Fahey, 52 Ill. 106. The baggage was
put aboard the car with knowledge of
the agent that the passenger was not
to go until the next trip. No person
was employed to take care of the baggage; each passenger was expected to
look out for his own. The trunk was
lost. Held, company liable: Logan v.
Rd., 11 Rob. (L. A.) 24;Warnerv. Rd.,
22 Iowa 166. The fact of the passenger
having paid no extra fare for the car-

riage of his baggage makes no difference
as to the responsibility of the carrier:

Graffam v. B. 6- M. Rd., 67 Ale. 234.
But where a passenger left port before
her baggage arrived for shipment, and
caused the delinquent baggage to be
shipped on another vessel, and part of
it was lost on such vessel, Reld, that
this was an ordinary case of shipment of
goods as freight, and that the shipowners
were responsible for the loss of the goods
as freight: The Alvira Harbeck, 2 Blatch.
336.
Storage.-The contract of storage at
the place of destination is a part of the
original contract to carry, and the party
liable on the main contract of carriage
is liable on the implied contract of storage: Brownell v. N. Y. C. Rd., 45 N.
Y. 184. Carriers are liable for baggage
left by passengers in charge of their
agents, such passengers intending to proceed with the same on the next train, or
left for convenience in departing from
the place where the baggage is deposited :
C. 4- A. Rd. v. Belknap, 11 Cush. 97.
It is not necessary that the place of deposit of passengers' baggage in a railroad
station be absolutely fire-proof or burglarproof. It need only be such a place as
a man of ordinary prudence might use
for the storage of his goods : 0., R. I.
4- Peoria Rd. v. Faheg, 52 Ill. 106.
After the arrival of a train or ship a
reasonable time will be given to passengers to remove their baggage, during
which time the carrier will be held liable,
as a carrier, for the safety of such baggage. He will be held an insurer of it;
but after the expiration of such time,
and especially after notice to the passenger to remove his baggage, the carrier's
liability as an insurer ceases, and in
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place of it the liability of a warehouseman exists. As a warehouseman, however, lie is still bound to preserve the
baggage with ordinary care, and is
responsible if it be lost through his
negligence : Vanhorn v. Kerrait,4 . D.
Smith 453.
Several cases illustrate
these propositions: thus where a passenger left for his own convenience his
baggage at the station over night, where
it was destroyed by accidental fire without the company's fault, it was held not
liable : Ross v. Hl., K. 4- T. Rd., 4 Mo.
App. 583; Roth v. Rd., 34 N. Y. 548;
Louisville Rd. v. Mazhan, 8 Bush 184.
In another case a passenger allowed his
baggage to remain at the station from
ten A. m1.until very near the same time
next day, and during the day it was the
custom of the defendant not to lock up
the baggage, but to keep watch over it,
and at night it was customarily put
under lock and key. The baggage was
lost. Ield, company not liable: Holdridge v. Rd., 56 Barb. 191. A passenger of a steamer having arrived at its
destination about twelve o'clock at night
left the boat in the morning, which was
on Sunday, at a reasonable hour for
rising, to visit a friend, with the intention of returning before the boat should
return for New York on the next day, and
then demanding her trunk, for the purpose of continuing her trip to Boston.
When she left the steamboat the trunk
had been stored by the boatmen in a
baggage-room used by them for such
purposes ; before she returned the trunk
and its contents were destroyed by fire
without any negligence on the part of
the carriers. Held, not liable, being
mere bailees: Jones v. Transportation
Co., 50 Barb. 193. A yalise left for a
few hours *,as lost. Held, that this was
a case of gratuitous bailment. Defendant was bound to exercise only slight
diligence and liable only for gross negligence: Minor v. C. 4- N. J1. IV. Rd.,
19 Wis. 40 ; Louisville Rd. v. Mahan,
8 Bush 184.
And where a passenger

on a railway omitted for three days to
demand his baggage. Held, that the
company's liability as a common carrier
had ceased, and they were only liable as
warehousemen: Fairfax v. N. Y. C.
Rd., 37 N. Y. (S. C.) 516 ; .43 JId.
A trunk was left over
(S. C.) 18.
night in the common room of defendant's station, instead of being placed in
the adjoining baggage-room, where it
properly belonged. During the night
some unknown person broke into the
room, and the trunk, and stole from it
certain valuables. Held, there being no
evidence of any effort to discover the
burglar, that defendant was liable as a
warehouseman, even if his liability as
a common carrier did not still exist:
Marnerv. Rd., 22 Iowa 166 ; Bartholomew v. Rd., 53 Ill. 227. A passenger,
who was lame, arrived at his destination
on the railroad and told the baggagemaster that he was lame and unable to
take his baggage with him, but that his
father would call for it. At this time
his father was absent from home, but he
returned in about two days, and called
for the trunk as soon as he got back. It
had been stored by the baggage-master
in the room occupied by passengers,
where they usually left baggage and
allowed baggage to be taken away. At
times no one of the company's employees would be present to watch the
baggage. There was a warehouse attached to the depot, but the baggage was
not placed in it. Held, that the company were liable for the loss of it: Curtis
v. Rd., 49 Barb. 148. A passenger did
not call for his trunk until the second
day after his arrival, when it could not
be found. The company did not show
any proof accounting for the failure to
deliver ; hence it was held that lie was
entitled to recover: Burnell v. N. Y. C.
Rd., 45 N. Y. 184. A passenger, at
the expiration of his journey, left his
baggage with the baggage-man, asking
him if it would be safe there until morning. The baggage-man said, Yes, but
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the trunk was lost before 3.30 next
morning. Held, company liable: Ouimit
v. Henshaw, 35 Vt. 604. See also Mote
v. C. 6- N. W. Rd., 27 Iowa 22; Fairfax v. N. Y. C. Rd., 67 N. Y. 11.
Delivery by Carrier.-Travellers are
entitled to require the delivery of their
baggage according to the usual course of
business: Ouimit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt.
604. It is the duty of a railway company to have baggage ready for delivery
on the platform or other usual place of
delivery: Patscheiderv. G. W. Rd., L.
R., 3 Ex. Div. 153. Warehousemen
are liable for losses occasioned by the innocent mistake of themselves or of their
servants in delivering goods to a person
not entitled to them : Waldron v. Rd.,
1 Dak. Ter. 351. Where a box had
nothing to which a check could be attached, and the passenger was informed
that it would be just as safe without a
check, and started on his journey, relying
on this statement, the box having been delivered to a third party without authority, instead of being sent on as contracted: Held, that the defendant were
liable for the loss of the box: Waldron
v. Rd., 1 Dak. Ter. 351. If the carrier
claims to have delivered the goods to an
agent of the owner or consignee, it must
be clearly proved that the person to whom
delivery was made was in fact agent and
duly authorized as such: Waldron v. C.
6- N. I. Rd., I Dak. Ter. 351. But
delivery may be waived by a passenger,
and if his baggage be lost after he has
waived delivery to himself personally he
cannot recover against the carrier. Thus,
where a passenger employed a hackman
in Boston to carry himself and two
trunks to a house on a certain street, at
each end of which posts were placed so
that a carriage could not enter it, and
upon the carrier proposing that the driver
should take another man to assist him in
carrying the trunks, the passenger said
that he would help, and when they arrived at the entrance to the street he
went to the house with a valise, leaving

the driver to unload the trunks, and then
returned suggesting that they take the
heavier trunk first, to which the driver
assented, saying: "I will set the other
in here," putting the smaller trunk inside
the posts, whereupon they went to the
house with the larger trunk, and upon
their return found that the other trunk
was gone. Held, that the passenger had
waived a delivery of the other trunks at
the house: Patten v. Johnson, 131 Mess.
297. A passenger, on her arrival at
Boston, asked permission to leave her
baggage for a short time. She was told
by the agent that he could not keep baggage so long with the check on, but that
it would be perfectly safe if she gave up
her checks, which she did. The baggage
was subsequently delivered to one falsely
claiming authority to receive it. Held,
that the defendant's obligation as a carrier was ended, and that the assurance
of the agent was not a contract for storage, being, in fact, in clear repugnance
to the regulations of the company, and
that defendant was not liable : Mattison
v. N. U.Rd., 57 N. Y. 552. When baggage arriving at its destination on one
road at night, has to be transferred to
another road that connects with it, and
the former road, on the arrival of the
train, has knowledge of the fact that such
baggage has to go on by the next train
in the morning over the other road, and
with this knowledge stores the baggage
in its baggage-room until the morning,
the owner not objecting, the question as
to whose custody the baggage was in
during the night is one which depends
upon the usual course of business in these
matters: Onimit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt.
604. The delivery of baggage by a
railway company at the end of the passenger's route, either to the passenger or
to his authorized agent, ends the liability
of the company as a common carrier, but
a delivery at the company's terminus to
the baggage-master of an independent
steamboat company, who by agreement
between the railroad and steamboat corn-
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panics always enters its cars before their
arrival at the depot, taking baggage.
checks of through-passengers and giving
them company's receipts therefor in exchange, will not free the company from
liability caused by the larceny of its servants after the delivery to the steamboat
baggage-master, unless he were the plaintiff's authorized agent to receive the baggage : Mobile 4- Ohio Rd. v. Hopkins,
41 Ala. 486. A demand for baggage by
tlhe passenger is, of course, necessary in
order to charge the carrier for the failure
to deliver it, hut it need not be a demand upon the directors of a corporation
which is a common carrier. It is sufficient to make the demand of agents of
the company who are charged with the
duty of receiving, keeping and delivering
passengers' property: Cass v. Rd., I E.
D. Smith 522. And when the baggage
is wrongfully detained the owner may
assign his title to the property, and the
assignee may make a fresh demand for
it, and then maintain an action in the
nature of trover.
Right to Regulate the Carnageqf Baggage and to Limit Liabilitytherefor.-As a
general rule a common carrier cannoteven
by a special agreement with the owner
release himself from liability for his failure to exercise ordinary care in transporting baggage : C. 4-A. Rd. v. Baldauf,
16 Penn. St. 67. He cannot contract for
exemption from liability for damages
caused by the negligence, wilful default
or tort of himself or his bervants.
This rule applies when he undertakes to
transport passengers gratuitously. It
also applies to an express stipulation for
tickets limiting the carrier's responsibility to a specific sum, as to the value of
the baggage: Mobile 4- Ohio Rd. v.
Hopkins, 41' Ala. 486. Nevertheless, a
carrier of passengers has the right to establish any reasonable regulations which
he considers necessary to secure the safety
of the baggage of his passengers, and if
the passenger knows the regulation, and
his baggage is lost, arid there is neglect

or refusal to comply with it, the carrier is
not answerable: Macklin v. N.J. Steamboat Co., 7 Abb. Pr. 229. And it may,
as an insurer of the property, stipulate
against liability for accidents and unaVoidahle losses: C., H. J- D. 4- D. M.
Rd. v. Pontius, 19 Ohio St. 221. But
public notice by a railroad company that
all baggage transported on their road is
at the risk of the owners will not exonerate the company from its liability as a
carrier: Logan v. Rd., 11 Rob. (La.)
2, 4 ; C. 4- A. Rd. v. Belknap, 11 Cush.
97 ; .onesv. Voorhees, 10 Ohio 145 ; C.
.4- A. Rd. v. Burk, 13Wend. 611; 1.4C. Rd. v. Cox, 29 Ind. 360; Rd. v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 647 ; tNetins v. Bay
City Steamboat Co., 4 Bos%,. 225 ; Rawson v. Rd., 2 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 220 ;
Cohen v. S. E. Rd., L. R., 2 Exch.
Div. 253; Williams v. G. TV. Rd., 10
Exeh. 15.
A carrier may stipulate against liability as an insurer for baggage exceeding
a fixed amount in value, except additional compensation proportionate to the
risk: Rd. v. Fraloff,100 U. S. 24. So
he may stipulate that he will not be liable in case of loss for merchandise and
jewelry, unless he be notified by the
owner'that these are in the baggage, and
an extra compensation be paid therefor :
Hopkins v. Wescott, 6 Blatch. 64. So
he may relieve himself from liability by
fire: Id.
Contractor Notice-Construction.-The
intention of carriers to limit their liability
where it is intended so to do, must be so
plainly expressed as to leave no room for
doubt as to their meaning.
Nothing
should remain to be ascertained by construction. Where there is any doubt as
to the meaning of a limiting notice, it
must be construed strictly as against the
carrier: Hopkins v. Wescott, 6 Blatch. 64.
Knowledge of the limitation must be
brought home to the passenger in time
for him to leave the car and have his
baggage removed before the train leaves.
The mere delivery of a ticket to a pas-
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senger, with a notice printed on its back
or on its face, is not generally sufficient
to raise the presumption of actual notice
to him before the train leaves: Wilson
v. Chesapeake 4- Ohio Rd., 21 Gratt.
654: Macdin v. t. .. Steamboat Co., 7
Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 229 ; Nivens v. Bay
State Steamboat Co., 4 Bosw. 235 ;
Malone v. Rd., 12 Gray 388; Brown v.
Rd., 11 Cush. 97. Where baggage is
delivered to carriers according to printed
conditions posted in various parts of
their boat, the consent of passengers to such conditions is not necessary.
It is enough that they know them, and
that fact being ascertained, compliance
with them will be required by law. But
it does not follow, from this, that pass engers are obliged to read these notices.
They are employed by carriers as a
means of bringing to passengers' notice
any reasonable regulation: Gleason v.
Goodrich Trans. Co., 32 Wis. 85. Passengers must be fully informed of the
terms and effect of the notice: C. 4- A.
Rd. v. Baldauf, 16 Penn. St. 67. It has
been held, however, that when a cloakroom ticket has on its face a plain and
unequivocal reference to the conditions
printed on the back of it, a person
taking such a ticket is bound by such
conditions, whether he has made himself
acquainted with them or not : Harris v.
G. [. Rd., 45 L. J., N. S., Q. B. 729.
Many instances are given in the books
of attempted limitation of liability of
carriers for baggage. Thus where a
baggage-man came into a car to re-check
baggage, and gave plaintiff a receipt for
his baggage marked, " Domestic Bill of
Lading," by which the carrier was exempted from liability under certain circumstances, which receipt the passenger
put in his pocket without reading, the car
being dimly lighted, so that plaintiff could
not have read it, had he tried to do so.
Held, that the carrier, in order to limit
its liability, must establish a contract
containing the special terms contained
in the receipt, and that it was proper to
VOL. XXXIII.-24

leave to a jury the question whether,
under the circumstances, the passenger
made such a contract by the acceptance
of the receipt: Maudan v. ,Sherard,73 N.
Y. 329. Generally, and without special
limitation, a carrier is not liable for
baggage lost by the act of God or the
public enemy; but loss by theft is not
within either of these exceptions: Woods
v. Devin, 13 Ill. 746. The fact that a.
guard of soldiers is set over a car, which
contains munitions or equipments of war,
even throughout the journey, does not
relieve the carrier from liability where
the control and management of the car,
as a part of the train, was not interfered
with or impeded in any way by such
guard : Hannibal Rd. v. Swft, 12 Wall.
262. Other cases present instances of
limitations of the amount for which the
company would be liable: Pepper v. S.
B. By., 7 L. T. (N. S.) 469 ; Steamship Co. v. Shand, 3 Aloore P. C. C.
Rd., 45
R
(N. S.) 272 ; H1arris v. G.
L. J. (N. S.) 729 ; Vantoll v. S. B. By.,
12 C. B. (N. S.) 75 ; Steers v. L., N.
Y. 4- P. Steamship Co., 57 N. Y. 1.;
Rd. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24.
Actions-Parties.-Anumber of cases
present the question, "Who has a right
to sue for damages occasioned by the loss
of or injury to baggage in transit ?"
When an agent contracts and pays for
the carriage of goods in the conduct of
their owner's business, and for his account, the action to recover for their loss
should properly be brought in the name
of the owner: Slowman v. G. IF. By.,
67 N. Y. 208. But where plaintiff gave
his valise to his servant to take with him
on defendant's railway, the plaintiff himself intending to travel by a later train,
and the servant bought his ticket, and
the valise in charge of the servant was
checked as the servant's personal baggage, and was within the weight allowed
him by law as personal baggage, Held,
that the owner of the baggage was not
the proper person to maintain an action
against the company for the loss thereof,
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although he travelled on the same day
and on the same route by a later train :
Becher v. Rd., L. R. 5 Q. B. 241. So
where a travelling salesman paid his fare
as a passenger in a railroad car and committed a trunk containing money belonging to his principal, not exceeding a reasonable amount for travelling expenses,
to the agent of the company, but without notice that the trunk contained money, and it was lost, Held, that the action would not lie in the name of the
principal upon the contract existing between the agent and the carrier : Weed
v. Saratoga 6- Schen. Rd., 19 Wend.
534; Stimson v. Conn. Rd., 78 Mass. 83.
Whether a married woman can sue in
her own name for the loss of her personal
baggage is governed by the law of the
place where the remedy is sought. Some
cases hold that a married woman may
sue for such baggage: Stoneman v. Erie
Rd., 52 N. Y. 29 ; Fraloffv. N. Y. C.
4. H. R. Rd., 10 Blatch. 16 ; Rawsonv.
Penn. Rd., 2 Abb. N. S. 220; McCormick v. Penn. Rd., 49 N. Y. 303. An
infant may bring an action by his next
friend to recover damage for the.loss or
injury to his baggage.
Other cases present questions as to
who may be sued for the loss of baggage.
Thus whether the driver of a cab or the
proprietor thereof is liable. A cab plying
in London in the ordinary way was hired
by the plaintiff to carry his baggage,
which was lost by the fault of the driver.
On the cab was the name of the defendant, as proprietor of it, which he in fact
was. The driver paid each day a certain sum of money to the defendant for
the use of the equipage, and made what
he could by the transaction. Red, under
the statute that the driver must be taken
to be an aget of the proprietor, with authority to make contracts for the employment of the cab on his account, and
that consequently the action was rightly
brought against the proprietor: Powles
v. Hgder, 6 El. & B. 207. A foreign
corporation doing business as a carrier

of passengers may be sued in New York
to recover the value of lost baggage
.7ones v. Trans. Co., 50 Barb. 193. The
form of the action may be either in tort
or e contractus. An action of tort before
a police justice is the proper form of
suing for a penalty of $10, provided by
the stat. 1854, c. 23, for the refusal of a
railroad company to take the baggage of
a company delivered to it for transportation: Conmonwealth v. Rd., 15 Gray
447.
Pleadings.-In declaring on the common-law obligation of a common carrier
it is only necessaryto allege the delivery
of the goods to their carrier to be carried by him bver the designated route,
and that they were received and accepted
by him. On these facts the duty arises,
for a breach of which the carrier is liable to the shipper: Wilson v. Chesapeake
6- Ohio Rd., 21 Grat. 654. It must be
alleged that the loss occurred through
the defendant's negligence: Candee v.
Penn. Rd., 21 Wis. 582. The plaintiff
need not allege that the baggage was lost
without his fault: Richards v. Wescott,
2 Bosw. 590. In suits before a justice
of the peace it is sufficient to file such a
statement of the cause of action as will
apprise the defendant of the nature of
the demand on such certificate that a second suit cannot be maintained for the
same cause of action : Leelin v. Rd., 10
Mo. App. 128. It-need not be alleged
that the plaintiff went as a passenger,
and that the trunk was taken as a part
of her baggage: J'ilson v. Chesapeake
6- Ohio Rd., 21 Grat. 654 ; Davisv. Rd.,
10 How. 330. Under : n allegation that
a hack was unfit for service, evidence is
admissible that it was overloaded: Lemon v. Chanslor, 68 Mo. 340.
Defences-Merchandise.-The general
rule is that the articles for which a railway or other carrier is liable to carry
safely as baggage include only such as
are necessary to the use, comfort and
convenience of the passenger during the
journey or immediately thereafter.
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What these articles are depends upon
the social position of the passenger,
length of journey and the country
through which or to which the passenger
travels. In some respects the rule is
comparable to the rule of law which regulates the liability of an infant for necessaries, that is, for such articles as he
buys that are suitable for his use, having
in consideration the social position and
standing of the infant. Just so social
position is to be considered in determinin- what is proper baggage for a passenger. Valuable jewels have been considered appropriate baggage for a Russian
countess, and would probably be so considered when carried by any person of
wealth and high social standing. So the
amount of baggage which a person may
carry upon a long journey may obviously
be greater than if the journey was a
short one to an adjacent city or village.
One of the limitations of the liability of
a carrier arises out of the kind of property
carried by the passenger as baggage, as
thus, a carrier is not liable for merchandise carried as baggage: for example,
for jewelry carried by the commercial
traveller of a jewelry house: Ailing v.
B. 4- A. Rd.: 126 Mass. 121; Richards
v. Wescott, 2 Bosw. 590; Collins v.
Boston 4- Maine Rd., 10 Cush. 506;
Cahill v. Rd., 10 C. B. (N. S.) 154;
Bluemantle v. .itchbug Rd.. 127 Mass.
322 ; Pardee v. Drew, 25 Wend. 459 ;
Belfast, 4-c., Rd., v. Keys, 9 H. L.
I. TV. Rd., 13
C. 555 ; Cahill v. L. 4-N
C. B. N. S. 818 ; Cin. 4- Chic. Air Line
Rd. v. Marcus, 38 Il1, 219 ; Stimson v.
Conn. River Rd., 98 Mass. 83; Smith
v. Rd., 44 N. H. 325; Rd. v. Capps, 23
Am. L. Reg., N. S., and note. Of course
if the railroad company or its agents be
informed that the trunk or box of the passenger contains merchandise they may be
held liable therefor, having been given
notice of its contents and an opportunity
to charge extra compensation for the carriage of it, and to take all necessary precautions for its safe preservation. The

fact that commercial travellers or others
are accustomed to carry merchandise in
passenger trains, they paying the usual
price for tickets of a passenger, even if
known to the carriers, will not render
them liable for such merchandise. The
passengers carry it at their own risk :
Ailing v. B. 4 A. Rd., 126 fass. 121.
So a railroad company has been held not
liable for a watch and handcuffs, locks,
medicines, &c., carried by a passenger:
Bomar v.Maxwell, 9 Uumph. 621. But
it has been held in at least one case that
if the package of merchandise is carried
openly or so packed that its nature is obvious, and the carrier does not object to
it, he will be liable for the loss of it:
Great North. By. v. Shepherd, 8 Exch.
30. And where a carrier demands and
receives compensation as freight for the
transportation of the merchandise, he is
liable for it as well as for the baggage :
Stoneman v. Rd., 12 N.Y. 419 ; Ross v.
31o., K. 6- T. Ry., 4 Mo. App. 583.
Where plaintiff wished to go from Little
Falls, N. Y., to New York city t-ia
Albany, and sent his trunk, on the suggestion of the New York Central Railroad Company, from Little Falls to
Athens, "via the People's Line of Steamers," to Nw York, via Albany on the
railroad, and the baggage was lost, held:
that the railroad company was not liable
for it, there being no contract between
it and the steamboat company, but simply an occasional transaction of this
kind: Green v. N. Y. Central Rd., 12
Abb. Pra¢. N. S. 473.
A passenger on a railroad informed
its agent that his trunk contained merchandise, in addition to his personal baggage, and paid the agent a compensation
for the extra weight as demanded, and
the trunks were destroyed, and the passenger brought an action to recover for
the loss of the baggage, in which the
court ruled that he could not recover for
the merchandise, but that he could, and
in fact, did recover for the baggage.
Held, in a subsequent action brought to

McCAFFREY v. CANADIAN PACIFIC RY. CO.
recover the value of the merchandise lost,
that the former action was not a bar,
since the two actions were based upon
separate contracts: Millard v. aM., K.T. Rd., 86 N. Y. 441.
Evidence.-As a general rule, the
agents of a corporation whose duty it is
to receive and take care of baggage, are
competent persons to testify as to its care,
So a
condition and transportation.
check is competent to prove the receipt
of baggage by a carrier. The evidence
of any witness who saw the baggage delivered to the carrier will be competent.
Questions have been raised as to the
competency of the husband or wife to
testify as to loss of each other's baggage.
Although the general rule is that a wife
is not a competent witness in behalf of
the husband, where the husband is a
party, yet where the husband is plaintiff
in a suit for lost baggage, both her testimony and his are admissible, from the
overruling necessities of the case. They.
alone know the contents of the baggage,
and must testify as to its value and contents, else the verdict of the jury upon
these points would in most cases be
mere guess work. In favor of this view
see Dibble v. Brown, 12 Ga. 217. As
to *check, see Hickox v. Rd., 31 Conn.
281. Still it has been held that in such
a case the wife is not a competent witness: Smith v. Rd., 44 X. H. 325.
Some of the old cases hold that in an
action against a railroad company to recover damages for the loss of baggage
by its negligence, the plaintiff is not a
competent witness, although he has no
other evidence: Snow v. Rd., 12 Mlet.
44; Dill v. Rd., 7 Rich. Law (S. C.)
158 ; Smith v. Rd., Martin's Law 203 ;
Pettigrew v. Barnum, 11 Md. 434. In
Indiana while the competency of the
plaintiff himself was admitted, his ex
parte affidavit as to the contents and
value of the baggage lost was excluded :
Indiana 0. Rd. v. Gulick, 19 Ind. 83.
See also Padorv. Rd., 26 Me. 458. In
New York it has been held that the rule

of evidence allowing the plaintiff to
prove the value of the contents of his
lost trunk by his own oath, is confined
to cases in which fraud or wrong is
proved by the defendants, and has no
application to cases of loss through negligence merely: Garvey v. Rd., 4 Abb.
Pr. 171. But probably the rule of law
that a passenger is not competent to
prove the contents and value of his own
trunk has been abrogated by the statute
permitting parties to actions to testify
therein on their own behalf: Am. C. Co.
v. Cross, 8 Bush 472 ; Jones v. Joorhees,
10 Ohio 151. In Pennsylvania it has
been held that trunks of husband and
wife being lost on a journey, both are
competent to testify as to the contents
and their value, and especially may the
wife be assumed usually to have packed
the trunk: McGill v. Rowand, 3 Penn.
St. 451 ; I C. Rd. v. Copeland, 24 Ill.
332 ; see Pettigrew v. Barnum, 11 Md.
434. In Tennessee the same rule has
been affirmed, but limited in its application to personal baggage, and not to
merchandise, the delivery of which to the
carrier, it was held, must be evidenced
by bills of lading: Johnson v. Stone, 11
Humph. 419. In Illinois it was held
that a person suing a railroad company
for the value of lost baggage is only permitted to be a witness in his own case
for the purpose of proving the contents
of the lost baggage, when no other evidence can be adduced.
He may be
permitted also to prove the value of the
contents, but he should not be allowed
to give evidence as to the value of the
articles in which the baggage is packed :
Davis v. Michigan So. Rd., 22 11. 278.
To the effect that a passenger may prove
the value of the contents of his own
baggage, see also Nolan T. 0. 4- M. Rd.,
39 Mo. 114 ; Doyle v. Kiser, 6 Ind.
242; Dibble v. Brown, 12 Ga. 217;
Merrill v. Grinnell, 30 N. Y. 549 ; Harlow v. Rd., 8 Gray 237.
Admissions.-The price paid for a
railroad ticket includes the carrying of
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baggage, and the recognition by the
company issuing the ticket of its validity,
is an. admission that the check given for
the baggage is equally binding: C., R.

F. 4: P. Rd. v. Fahey, 52 111. 81. A
delivery of checks to a connecting carrier
is evidence tending to show the delivery
of the baggage represented by such checks
to said carrier: Kan. Pac. Rd. v. Mantelle, 10 Kan. 119. The admissions of
the conductor, baggage-master or stationmaster, as to the manner of the loss, are
admissible in evidence against the corporation: Morse v. Rd., 6 Gray 450.
But probably such admissions would be
required to have been made so near the
time of the loss or damage to the baggage as to be part of the res gestce: Rd.
v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 649 ; Curtis v.
Rd., 49 Barb. 148. A statement made
to the plaintiff by the superintendent of a
railroad company on presentation of
plaintiff's claim that the claim was a
"good one," constituted no part of the
res gestce, but related to a past transaction, and was held inadmissible as evidence against the railroad company :
Green v. N. Y. C. Rd., 12 Abb. Pr. N.
S. 473.
In an action against a railroad company to recover the value of a trunk and
its contents alleged to have belonged to
the plaintiff as a passenger, and to have
been lost by the company, the evidence
tended to show that the trunk belonged
to a third person who took it away from
the depot without the knowledge of the
agent of the company, and then
procured the plaintiff to bring -suit
for its recovery. The evidence tending thus to show the community of
interest and design between the plaintiff and such third person: hdd, that
a letter written by the latter to a
stranger to the transaction going to show
the conspiracy was admissible in evidence against the plaintiff: C., R. L 4P. Rd. v. Collins, 501 Ill. 212.
Presumptions.-Inthe absence of proof
of any contract on the part of the carrier

to carry a passenger and baggage to
any particular place or city in the carrier's port of destination, it will be presumed that the carrier undertook to
transport the passenger and baggage to
the place in the port fixed by the established usage and custom of the carrier
for the landing of its passengers and their
baggage : Klein v. Pack-ettt Co., 3 Daly
390. So, assent to conditions affecting
liability is presumed from the acceptance
of a carrier's receipt, or bill of lading:
Steers v. L., N. Y. 4- P. Steamboat Co.,
57 N. Y. 1. That the loss of a trunk
is presumed to have been evidence of the
negligence or fraud of the carrier or its
agent: C. ,- A. Rd. v. Baldqfu, 16
Penn. 67. See alse Fairfaxv. N. Y. C.
4-H. R.Rd., 37 N.Y. 516 ; Brownellsv.
N. Y. C. Rd.,46 N. Y. 184. But see
Stimson v. Conn. River Rd., 98 Mass.
83: Smith v. Rd.. 44 N. H. 325. The
court may take judicial notice of established railroad routes generally known
and used: Fairfax v. N. Y. C. Rd.,
37 N. Y. (S. C.) 516.
Miscellaneous Instances.-To justify a
common carrier in his defence that he
had limited his liability substantially by
notice brought home to the knowledge of
the plaintiff, the evidence must show not
only that the plaintiff had his attention
called to the carrier's notice, limiting his
liability in certain expressed contingencies, but it must also appear that the
passengers assented to the terms and conditions of the notice: Nevins v. Bay
State Steamboat Co., 4 Bosw. 225. The
possession of checks by a passenger, and
the testimony of the baggage-master
that when required by passengers he
put checks on their baggage, giving
the duplicates to the passenger, is
enough to prove that the plaintiff
was a passenger, and that his baggage
was checked : Davis v. C. S. Rd., 10
How. Pr. 330. So it has been intimated
by Judge WOODRUFF that if a passenger's residence, business, station in life,
place from whence he came and whither
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hc was going, and the fact whether he
was a rich or a poor man, and where
he had been travelling, were "matters
which affect the carrier's liability; they
should have been shown by actual evidence to have been brought within the
knowledge of the carrier when it undertook to carry the plaintiff: Nevins v.
Bay State Steamboat Co., 4 Bosw. 225.
Proof of the general care with which the
baggage-room and its contents were
guarded is not sufficient to establish conclusively that there was no want of care
in the particular instance on trial: Fairfax v. A. Y. C. Rd., 67 N. Y. 11.
Where there is no proof that plaintiff is
a surgeon or physician, or student of
medicine, he cannot recover for the loss
of a case of surgical instruments : Giles
v. Fauntleroy, 13 Md. 136. The mere
fact of a traveller who has secured a
stateroom choosing at first to wear his
overcoat rather than deposit it in the
stateroom in thecustody of the defendant,
is no indication that he intends to hold
the overcoat in his possession during the
whole trip: Gore v. _rorwich Trans. Co.,
2 Daly 254. The words "personal
baggage," written in pencil on the margin of a receipt for goods to be shipped
on an ocean voyage, there being no evidence as to when and by whom said
pencil marks were written, does not
alter the fact that the goods thus shipped
without the owner'accompanying them
are freight, and not personal baggage:
Re Alvira Harbeck, 2 Blateh. 236.
Evidence that passengers other than the
plaintiff were allowed by the defendant
railroad company to take with them, as
passengers, bundles of merchandise, and
without objection on the part of defendant, has no )cgal tendency to an agreement that they were to be regarded as a

part of their baggage and paid for by
the passsenger's ticket, or were to be
taken at the risk of the company: Smith
V. Rd., 44 N. H. 325.
Damages-M1easure.-The usual contract of a carrier of passengers includes
an undertaking to receive and transfer
their baggage. If nothing be said about it,
and if the baggage be lost, even without
the fault of the carrier, he is responsible
for it. The actual damages arising from
the breach is the measure of damages in
this form of action: fIississippi Rd. v.
Kennedy, 41 Miss. 671. Damages can*not be recovered for expenses in searching for lost baggage: Texas 6- P. Rd. v.
Ferguson, 9 A. & E. Railroad Cas. 395.
The market value of the articles lost is
deemed an ultimate compensation, and
this is the proper measure of the right
of recovery: Texas 6- P. Rd. v. Ferguson,
9 A. & E. Railroad Cas. 395. Where
money is lost in a trunk the passenger
can only recover for so much money as
was necessary for his personal use and
travelling expenses during the journey:
.ickox v. Rd., 31 Conn. 281. In the
absence of proof as to the contents of a
trunk-and their value, damages may be
given by the jury proportionately to the
value of the articles which they, in their
judgment, think the trunk did and might
fairly contain : Dill v. Rd., 7 Rich. Law
(S. C.) 158. It is an error to instruct a
jury in a suit for damages against a railroad company, in which exemplary dam.
ages are claimed, to return a verdict for
such damages which they believe, from
the evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to,
without furnishing a rule for their guidance in discriminating between actual
and exemplary damages: G., H. 4- S.
A. Rd. v. Dunlavy, 56 Texas 256.
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